Who Needs Venice When Zagreb (or Bruges . . .) Beckons?

By GISELA WILLIAMS
NYtimes April 22, 2007


Affordable Europe | Second-Tier Cities

EXPECT to pay $14 for the Eiffel Tower. And more than $100 for a gondola ride through the canals of Venice. No, Europe's tourist capitals don't come cheap. To save some serious money this year, opt for Europe's lesser-known, second-tier cities. You might get a blank stare from less-worldly travelers when you mention Zagreb, but you'll score points in other ways, including your wallet.

VALENCIA

Jet-setters who complain that Barcelona has become too trendy and too touristy are heading south, to the Mediterranean city of Valencia. Stealing some of Barcelona's design and culinary mojo, Spain's third-largest city has transformed itself in recent years from a neglected port city into a cool resort.

The America's Cup is in town this summer. And Santiago Calatrava, a native son, has brought architectural buzz to the city with his futuristic, helmet-shaped Opera House (www.lesarts.com), part of the City of Arts and Sciences (www.cac.es ), a dazzling complex of polished glass.

But despite its new luster, Valencia is still authentically Spanish. One of its hottest neighborhoods, Barrio del Carmen, is also one of its oldest. It's where aging Spaniards gossip over carajillos (liquor-spiked espresso), artists hobnob in tiny galleries, and hip gays order cañas (glasses of beer) at funky bars.

And you know Valencia's restaurant scene is heating up when Barcelona's epicureans are driving two hours for lunch. For an affordable taste of Valencian cuisine, head to Casa Montaña (Calle José Benlliure 69; 34-96-367-2314; www.emilianobodega.com) and order the delicious anchovies (2.40 euros, about $3.25 at $1.36 to the euro), cooked fava beans (2.40 euros) and cod fish croquettes (1.40 each). If you're in the mood for clóchinas, or mussels, the place to go is El Pilar (Calle Moro Zeit 13; 34-96-391-0497), a 90-year-old tapas bar with just seven tables.

NAPLES

Rome is being invaded — not by soldiers, but by “Da Vinci Code” tours and outrageously expensive cafes. For a far cheaper bite of the Italian dolce vita, go to seaside Naples.

Long associated with organized crime, chaotic traffic and a volcano (Vesuvius), Naples is more rough-edged than the Eternal City. But Naples has calmed down and cleaned up just enough to attract the bohemian set, thanks to a dynamic mayor who is promoting the arts, from subway installations by Sol LeWitt to the new Palazzo delle Arti Napoli (www.palazzoartinapoli.net).

Mixing things up are private art spaces like 404 Gallery (www.404gallery.com) and Not Gallery (www.notgallery.com), as well as the Hotel Correra 241 (Via Correra 241; 39-081-195-62-842; www.correra.it), a 10-room boutique hotel with rotating art exhibits. Doubles start at 75 euros.

The food in Naples isn't bad, either. After all, there are a mind-boggling 12,000 pizzerias in town. You can't go wrong with Pizzeria di Matteo (94 Via Tribunali; 39-081-455-262) and L'Antica Pizzeria da Michele dal 1870 (Via Cesare Sersale 1/3; 39-081-553-9204; www.damichele.net), which serve two types of fresh pies (marinara or margherita) with perfectly thin crusts for about 4 euros.

ZAGREB

Take Vienna's florid architecture, throw in Budapest's bubbling cafe culture, and you get Zagreb, Croatia's grand capital. A showcase of fin-de-siècle architecture capped by not one, but two hilltop medieval towns, Zagreb's unexpected beauty is drawing sophisticated weekenders.

One could spend an entire day just wandering from cafe to cafe on Trg Bana Jelacica, the main square, chatting with the friendly and fashionable locals. At night, the action moves to the city's old-style restaurants. At the rustic favorite Vallis Aurea (Tomiceva 4; 385-1-48-31-305), you can order hearty dishes like pork cutlets or rump steak for under 8 euros. Afterward, cross the street to Vinoteka Pantheon (Tomiceva 5; 385-1-48-33-907), a chic new bar that serves Croatian delicacies and wine.

The shopping is surprisingly good, too. All the global fashion labels are present, but residents are just as likely to peruse the Hrelic flea market on Sunday mornings for 1960's chandeliers and Modernist furniture. The one thing Zagreb lacks is designer hotels, which is just as well, considering that grand places like the Hotel Dubrovnik (Gajeva 1; 385-1-4863-555; www.hotel-dubrovnik.hr), on Trg Bana Jelacica, start at just 120 euros (about $165).

BRUGES

Bruges, a medieval city in the Flemish region of Belgium, has fairy-tale streets, gingerbread houses and winding canals that lead to old windmills. Call it the other Amsterdam, except that few American travelers seem to know it. But that might change, thanks to a new film, “In Bruges,” starring Colin Farrell and Ralph Fiennes.

Before the movie fans arrive, savor what this former Viking city excels at: decadent chocolate and beers made by Trappist monks. Follow your nose to the Chocolate Line (Simon Stevinplein 19; 32-50-34-10-90; www.thechocolateline.be), an old-fashioned shop in the center of town where residents get their sweet fix. You can choose from 60 varieties including Tonka — made of white ganache with coconut milk, bourbon vanilla and Venezuelan tonka beans (4 euros per 100 grams).

When it comes to beer, steer clear of the tourist traps like Brugs Beertje, and head to Cambrinus (Philipstockstraat 19; 32-50-3-23-28; www.cambrinus.eu), a historic bar that serves 400 beers and bar food like steak frites. Wait until you get to Halve Maan (Walplein, 26; 32-50-33-26-97; www.halvemaan.be) — the only active brewery in the town center — before ordering the Brugse Zot, its house brew (2.50 and 3 euros).

But be careful. Those monks like their beer strong: most contain 8 percent to 11.5 percent alcohol.

Guantanamo not that high on Cuba's wish list

Even as it is rankled by the U.S. troop presence, Havana may find the base serves a better purpose as a symbol of American hegemony.

By Carol J. Williams, LA Times.
April 18, 2007


GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA — Fidel Castro wages silent protest against the U.S. military "tenants" of this bay in southern Cuba from a drawer in his desk.

There lie 47 uncashed checks drawn on the U.S. Treasury, each for $4,085, the annual rent fixed in a 1903 lease agreement that has vexed the Cuban leader since a leftist revolution brought him to power nearly half a century ago.

The presence of U.S. troops on Cuban soil has long rankled Castro, who, before taking ill in July and temporarily ceding presidential authority to his brother Raul, often ranted about the "imperialist occupation" in speeches and broadcasts.

But would he take it back if Washington offered to tear up the lease today?

Julia Sweig, director of Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, pointed out the international outcry over the Pentagon's use of the base at Guantanamo to detain and prosecute prisoners held in the U.S.-declared war on terrorism, and suggested handing over the property as a possible solution.

"One way to unload the problem would be to give it back to Cuba," she said. "The question is, would the Cubans want it back?

"Because it's become such a global symbol of what has gone wrong with America — not just a symbol of our colonial impulses but of the anti-imperialist fight throughout Latin America — it's something Cuba uses to greater benefit than getting the base back."

In a report issued last month on Guantanamo's role in the troubled diplomatic relationship between Havana and Washington, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs think tank concluded that returning the territory to Cuba would be essential to ending the United States' perceived domination of Latin American neighbors.

During President Bush's trip last month through Latin America, even friendly leaders reminded him of the message conveyed to the region by U.S. military occupation of the Cuban territory, said the council's director, Larry Birns.

"Guantanamo is the symbol of 19th century gunboat diplomacy practiced by Washington," Birns said. He added that a movement was gaining ground throughout the Western Hemisphere "questioning the United States' legitimacy in occupying Guantanamo under the present arrangement."

Caleb McCarry, the Bush administration's point man on a post-communist Cuba, said that Guantanamo would be on the table — if and when the island threw off its one-party regime.



'A colonial relic'

The U.S. government gained control of Guantanamo Bay and its surrounding territory in 1903 under an agreement between the newly independent Cuban government and its U.S. liberators after the 1898 Spanish-American War.

At the time, the military wanted a base to position U.S. forces to protect the Panama Canal, then under construction. The base also played an important role during the Cold War, allowing U.S. forces to monitor Soviet movements in the region.

But since the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union and its communist empire and the 1999 return of the Panama Canal to its host nation, the U.S. base has lost its strategic significance and now serves as little more than "a colonial relic," Birns asserted.

The 103-year-old agreement limits use of the Cuban territory to "coaling and naval purposes only," neither of which appears to cover the prison or tribunal operations.

The agreement also expressly prohibits "commercial, industrial or other enterprise within said areas," but the U.S. base now sports a McDonald's, two Starbucks outlets, a Subway sandwich shop and other American concessions.

Such breaches of the treaty render it voidable, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs stated in its report urging the U.S. government to cease its use of Guantanamo against the host country's wishes.

Although U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have publicly acknowledged that many foreign allies view the detention center and war crimes tribunal as illegitimate, some U.S. officials argue that the base remains crucial to American interests in the region.



'A vital role'

"Guantanamo serves a vital role in Caribbean regional security, protection from narco-trafficking and terrorism, and safeguards against mass-migration attempts in un-seaworthy craft," said Navy Cmdr. Jeffrey D. Gordon, a Pentagon spokesman, the latter referring to use of the base as a refugee camp for intercepted Haitian and Cuban rafters.

Analysts such as Sweig point out, however, that the idea of closing Guantanamo has repeatedly surfaced over the years during Pentagon belt-tightening efforts that have led to the closure of nearly 100 other military bases. Before the January 2002 arrival of the first terrorism suspects, Guantanamo had dwindled to about 300 military personnel. It now has more than 8,500.

In the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, also known as the Libertad Act, Washington offered to open negotiations with a democratically elected Cuban government aimed at returning Guantanamo or redefining the lease terms to Havana's satisfaction.

The State Department's acting Cuba desk chief, John Regan, said Havana had not made an issue of the base, which under the agreement is leased in perpetuity unless both sides agree to end it.

"To my knowledge, the Cubans have never officially asked for it back," Regan said.

Nor have they raised any objection to the detention mission at the monthly fence-line meeting of U.S. and Cuban military officials, the forum at which they were advised of the new role for the base at a January 2002 meeting, Regan said.

Neither officials in Havana nor Cuban diplomats in Washington responded to numerous telephone and e-mail requests to express their views on Guantanamo. But American business, political and cultural figures with regular contact with Cuban leaders say they have the impression that Castro's government wants the U.S. military off the island but that the issue isn't a priority now.

Sarah Stephens, head of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, said she'd never heard Cuban officials mention Guantanamo during any of her 30-plus trips to Havana with congressional and other delegations.



Beyond Havana's control

"I always just assumed it was something they know they can't control," she said of the lease deal, noting that the annual rent checks hadn't been cashed since the first year Castro was in power.

The revolutionary leader hadn't yet aligned his government with the Soviet Union when, in the summer of 1959, he cashed the U.S. Treasury check for that year's base rental. U.S. officials have cited that action in defending their continued use of the base, contending that it signaled his acceptance of the December 1903 agreement.

"About two years ago I asked President Fidel Castro, 'What is the policy the Cuban government takes if one of the terrorists escapes from Guantanamo onto Cuban soil?' " said Albert Fox, a Tampa businessman and head of the Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy, a pro-engagement lobby. "He responded, 'They are already on Cuban soil.' "

Koreans Fearful of Racial Backlash

By Ryu Jin
The Korea Times, Staff Reporter

The South Korean government hopes that the tragic Virginia massacre will neither strain South Korea-U.S. relations nor stir up racial prejudice or retaliatory actions.

The statement was released after President Roh Moo-hyun expressed deep condolences to all Americans, especially the bereaved families of the victims in the shooting spree.

``I and the people of this country are greatly shocked and saddened by the tragedy in the United States,’’ he said in a statement televised across the country. ``We hope U.S. society will overcome this sadness and regain tranquility as early as possible.’’

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo also expressed deep sadness and gave words of comfort to the bereaved families of the victims on behalf of the South Korean people and the government.

Put on high alert, the government has been making efforts to ensure the rampage would not lead to any ethnic confrontation in the United States.

Virginia police identified the gunman who killed 32 people and wounded dozens in the rampage as Cho Seung-hui, a 23-year-old South Korean student majoring in English literature there. He later took his own life and his motives were not known immediately.

Roh, who has already expressed condolences twice the previous day, held an emergency meeting at Chong Wa Dae to discuss follow-up measures, according to officials.

A presidential aide who attended the meeting said that the participants expressed hope that the incident would not have too much negative influence on South Korea-U.S. relations.

``We hope that the tragedy would not stir up any racial prejudice or retaliatory acts against our people,’’ he said. ``We would take extra precautions to calm down the Korean-American community in confusion and shock and prevent possible damage to other Koreans.’’

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Song Min-soon also sent a personal letter of condolences for the victims to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, calling the incident a ``tragedy that should have never taken place.’’

Song also convened an emergency meeting the previous night and decided to dispatch a task force to the U.S. as part of efforts to minimize the fallout of the incident.

Officials at the ministry were concerned over a possible backlash against South Korean residents living in the U.S. and the negative impact on the alliance, recenetly strengthened by the conclusion of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on April 2.

``We are afraid that the incident could deal a serious blow to the national image and status as the world’s 11th largest economy,’’ a ministry official said. ``We are also trying to minimize the negative impacts on the general relations between the two countries.’’

South Korean politicians were quick to call for concrete government measures to prevent the tragedy from causing any damage to Koreans living in the U.S. and straining the alliance between the two countries.

``I can’t contain my shock and sorrow,’’ Uri Party Chairman Chung Sye-kyun said. ``These kinds of incidents can stoke various kinds of worries, and the disturbance should be put under control as quickly as possible.’’

``I express my deep sorrow for the victims and their family members,’’ said Chairman Kang Jae-sup of the main opposition Grand National Party. ``I also hope the incident will not cause a crack in South Korea-U.S. ties.’’

Why I Declined To Serve

By John J. Sheehan
Washingtonpost, April 16, 2007

Service to the nation is both a responsibility and an honor for every citizen presented with the opportunity. This is especially true in times of war and crisis. Today, because of the war in Iraq, this nation is in a crisis of confidence and is confused about its foreign policy direction, especially in the Middle East.

When asked whether I would like to be considered for the position of White House implementation manager for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I knew that it would be a difficult assignment, but also an honor, and that this was a serious task that needed to be done. I served as the military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense in the mid-1980s and more recently as commander in chief of the Atlantic Command during the Cuban and Haitian migrant operation and the reconstruction of Haiti. Based on my experience, I knew that a White House position of this nature would require interagency acceptance. Cabinet-level agencies, organizations and their leadership must buy in to the position's roles and responsibilities. Most important, Cabinet-level personalities must develop and accept a clear definition of the strategic approach to policy.

What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. In my view, there are essentially three strategies in play simultaneously.

The first I call "the Woody Hayes basic ground attack," which is basically gaining one yard -- or one city block -- at a time. Given unconstrained time and resources, one could control the outcome in Iraq and provide the necessary security to move on to the next stage of development.

The second strategy starts with security but adds benchmarks for both the U.S. and Iraqi participants and applies time constraints that should guide them toward a desired outcome. The value of this strategy is that everyone knows the quantifiable and measurable objectives that fit within an overall strategic framework.

The third strategy takes a larger view of the region and the desired end state. Simply put, where does Iraq fit in a larger regional context? The United States has and will continue to have strategic interests in the greater Middle East well after the Iraq crisis is resolved and, as a matter of national interest, will maintain forces in the region in some form. The Iraq invasion has created a real and existential crisis for nearly all Middle Eastern countries and created divisions among our traditional European allies, making cooperation on other issues more difficult. In the case of Iran, we have allowed Tehran to develop more policy options and tools than it had a few years ago. Iran is an ideological and destabilizing threat to its neighbors and, more important, to U.S. interests.

Of the three strategies in play, the third is the most important but, unfortunately, is the least developed and articulated by this administration.

The day-to-day work of the White House implementation manager overseeing Iraq and Afghanistan would require a great deal of emotional and intellectual energy resolving critical resource issues in a bureaucracy that, to date, has not functioned well. Activities such as the current surge operations should fit into an overall strategic framework. There has to be linkage between short-term operations and strategic objectives that represent long-term U.S. and regional interests, such as assured access to energy resources and support for stable, Western-oriented countries. These interests will require a serious dialogue and partnership with countries that live in an increasingly dangerous neighborhood. We cannot "shorthand" this issue with concepts such as the "democratization of the region" or the constant refrain by a small but powerful group that we are going to "win," even as "victory" is not defined or is frequently redefined.

It would have been a great honor to serve this nation again. But after thoughtful discussions with people both in and outside of this administration, I concluded that the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically. We got it right during the early days of Afghanistan -- and then lost focus. We have never gotten it right in Iraq. For these reasons, I asked not to be considered for this important White House position. These huge shortcomings are not going to be resolved by the assignment of an additional individual to the White House staff. They need to be addressed before an implementation manager is brought on board.

The writer is a retired Marine Corps general.

Nancy Pelosi, Respectfully Maintaining Her Own Image

FASHION

By Robin Givhan
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 6, 2007.

Over the past week, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi toured the Middle East with a congressional entourage and a generous collection of scarves. The scarves provided her with an additional bit of sartorial modesty when the situation required it and she was also able to use them to cover her head when protocol dictated -- such as when she visited the tomb of John the Baptist inside a mosque in Damascus and tied one around her head in the manner of a Hitchcock heroine.

Other Western women have visited the Middle East and have had to cover their heads, but they often looked as though that requirement came as a surprise and in a pinch they reached for the nearest available square of fabric. Being respectful demands a certain mindfulness in order not to look like one is wearing a tablecloth.

The point is not to have some glitzy bit of silk to cover the head -- being flashy would defeat the point. It is to avoid looking unprepared and awkward. Grabbing half-heartedly for the table linens may be following the letter of the cultural rules, but not the spirit. To some degree, it is reminiscent of when a man arrives for an event that requires business attire and he is wearing black walking shoes instead of dress ones. He gets a pass, but really, he should know better.

Pelosi's scarf collection included a red print style that she wore around her neck when she was in Jerusalem. In Syria and Saudi Arabia, she wore one dominated by yellow. And then while in Beirut, she had a blue scarf tied jauntily around the strap of her shoulder bag.

In each example, the scarf was incorporated into the day's wardrobe. One hesitates to say that she accessorized her ensembles with the scarves because that makes it sound as though their significance can be equated with a pair of earrings or a strand of pearls. They were more meaningful than that. They allowed her to be respectful of the day's hosts while maintaining her own public identity. She looked like herself and she maintained control of the visual message.

There are few images more discomforting than public figures thrust into foreign cultures and required to wear the host's traditional attire. Almost without exception the visitors tend to look smaller and more vulnerable. They evoke the uneasiness of children who have been dressed by a parent, teacher, minister or other authority figure. Wearing something unfamiliar or inappropriate in a public forum has a way of deflating even the most pompous figures. Their body language communicates their uneasiness. Our eyes register the sight as jarring.

One such searing image was captured in November, when world leaders including President Bush, Russia's Vladimir Putin, Canada's Stephen Harper and Chile's Michelle Bachelet gathered for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hanoi. During the conference, the group was photographed dressed in traditional Vietnamese costumes. They all looked, if not like they wanted to be somewhere else, at least like they wanted to be wearing something else.

Everyone has tools they rely on to help them look as dignified as they feel. Take away those aides and it can be more difficult to maintain one's bearing.

Clothing can evoke authority, but at the most basic level it is an expression of control. Prison coveralls wrest autonomy from convicts. School uniforms attempt to level the playing field so that no clique can dominate the student body. In both cases, individuals fight to reclaim a sense of self, whether by shortening the hem of a skirt or accessorizing the body with tattoos.

When the recently released British detainees were trotted in front of the media in Iran, the men were not in the uniform of their country, which would have been a reminder of their international stature, but rather in look-alike shabby suits and no ties. They were dressed in the image of Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Western mufti was appropriated and served as a stand-in for an emasculating uniform, making the seamen appear small and uncertain. The lone woman looked like she had been overpowered by someone else's cultural traditions.

Pelosi, with her carefully coordinated scarves, respected her foreign surroundings without ceding any control. She assiduously avoided leaving a trail of cringe-inducing photographs in which she looked so uncomfortable she might as well have been dressed in a coat of porcupine quills. Her multipurpose, culturally adaptable scarves underscored the reality that sometimes it not only matters who you are, but also what you wear.

Who Got the British Sailors Released?

By CATHERINE MAYER/LONDON AND AZADEH MOAVENI/TEHRAN
time.com Wednesday, Apr. 04, 2007


The President of Iran was clearly relishing his role as beneficent liberator of the 15 British Marines and sailors detained by Iran for nearly two weeks. At a press conference today, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the release a "gift to the British people" on the occasion of Easter as well as a commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday. The smiling President then met with the British detainees, nodding his head munificently as they lined up to offer thanks for their release. "It is for Islam," he reminded one. He joked to another: "You ended up on a compulsory visit, didn't you?"

As much as today's events appeared to be another episode of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad show, the Iranian president's actual role in ending the crisis may have been less than meets the eye. The office of the presidency in Iran does not really have a say in matters of foreign policy. Indeed, British analysts were quick to credit another political personage for the resolution of the drama. John Williams, the former Director of News of Britain's Foreign Office, asserts that Dr. Ali Larijani, the secretary general of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, was more important in calling the shots. "It seems that around the weekend, Dr. Larijani decided to settle this and took control," says Williams. "He has proved himself a significant power broker, a man who, if he feels it is in Iran's best interests, will do business with the international community." Other observers warn against giving Larijani too much credit. Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei, they say, may have decided that Iran had squeezed as much advantage out of the situation as possible and simply got Larijani to do the legwork to end the crisis.

Observers in Britain don't doubt that the release of the detainees was in Iran's best interest. "If the saga had dragged on, it would have led to an escalation of international opinion against Iran," says Chris Rundle, a former British diplomat in Iran, noting that it took Iran 13 days to coordinate its policy. Sir Christopher Meyer, Britain's former ambassador to the U.S., describes the decision as "a shrewd move. The detainees were a wasting asset." The sudden announcement also reinforced a sense that Iran, and not Britain, was dictating the pace.

Having Ahmadinejad deliver the breakthrough news may have been intended to buttress that image. He remains a symbol of Tehran's defiance of the West, and, for a politician of limited power, Ahmadinejad still knows how to play his role to maximum advantage. Nazenin Ansari, the diplomatic correspondent of the London-based Persian-language weekly Kayhan, believes he and Iran's hardliners have benefited from the showdown with Britain. "What we have seen is a shift to the right," she says. Reformists had been making progress, but "in Iran politics is all about changing the atmosphere. The current has now shifted in the same way it did during the 1979 hostage crisis."

In his press conference, Ahmadinejad said the captives would have been let go sooner but that the "British government behaved badly, and so it took a little while." When asked what prompted the sudden release, he said London had sent a letter promising that such incidents would not be repeated. While careful to point out that the British sailors were being released "as a gift, and not as a result of the letter," the president's reference to a British concession served as a face-saving device, rationalizing the sudden release after much clamor in Iran for a possible trial of the British service personnel.

The Iranian leadership — including Larijani, Ahmadinejad and certainly Khamenei — believes that Tehran's popularity among the world's Muslims, particularly for its face-off against America, gives it leverage in dealing with the West. "Iranians had bruised egos because of international pressure over their nuclear program and the detentions of their personnel by the U.S. in Iraq," says Ansari. "What we've seen is a public relations exercise to take command of the Arab street once again." Says Shahid Malik, one of the first Muslims elected to Britain�s parliament: "This was yet another example of how adept Ahmadinejad is at communications in the way he targets the Muslim and non-Muslim world." During the press conference, Ahmadinejad made the expected jabs at the West, referring to the U.N. Security Council as "an organization they've created" and its resolutions as "pieces of paper they keep passing." He then accused Britain of involvement in a series of bombings in Iran's ethnic minority provinces in the past two years, while saying he would avoid going into detail lest the session "turn bitter."

Downing Street welcomed the move with public caution and mopped brows behind closed doors. As the crisis dragged on, government sources acknowledged that Iran's intransigence was exposing Britain's comparative impotence. It had failed to secure a strong denunciation of Iran's actions from the U.N. Security Council; its European allies were balancing support for Britain against their business interests; and although Prime Minister Tony Blair warned a failure to reach a quick resolution would lead to a "new phase" in response to the detentions, nobody detected in his words the martial sounds of rattling sabers. "There's no mood here for military adventures in Iran or elsewhere," says Malik. "Iraq wasn't what we thought it would be. There's a somber mood in this country."

I cannot quit my place among the gloom-mongers. We still look like losing

Whatever the tactical successes of the US surge, it is hard to believe that anything other than defeat and disaster await

Max Hastings
Tuesday April 3, 2007
The Guardian

Every now and again, grown-up people review their cherished opinions and prejudices. Does the evidence still stack up? Or are there grounds for thinking again? It seems especially important to do this at regular intervals with Iraq, because its fate is critical for the west.
Sceptics have for years been rehearsing a countdown to a day of doom. I am often among their number. But, as a compulsive consumer of the torrent of analysis and situation reports that comes out of Iraq, I sometimes shut my eyes and ask: is there a shred of hope?

Europeans are prone to think of the Americans who run the place as body-armoured oafs. If this was sometimes true in the past, it is certainly not so now. On the contrary, the US has belatedly entrusted the salvation of Iraq to its best and brightest - and I do not use that phrase pejoratively.

David Petraeus, who commands, is probably the cleverest and most imaginative general in the American army. He has assembled around himself a cluster of like-minded people, passionately committed to retrieving the country from the brink of disaster. Colonel HR McMaster, for instance, the most successful unit commander to have served in Iraq, was whisked back to Baghdad from an academic fellowship in London to join Petraeus's team.

Stephen Biddle, a civilian academic from the US Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of some outstanding papers on the country's plight, and was suddenly plucked out of Washington a fortnight ago to work 13 hours a day with Petraeus's brainstormers. Graeme Lamb, Petraeus's senior British deputy, is as able a soldier as the army has got.

Despite the latest Iraqi government figures showing civilian deaths up in March, the evidence is that Bush's "surge", entrusted to Petraeus's direction, is achieving real results. In Baghdad, there has been a dramatic fall in the rate of murders, suicide-bombings, insurgent attacks. Many Sunnis have become deeply hostile to the depredations of al-Qaida's foreign fighters. In some cases, Sunnis have taken violent action to expel or eliminate the intruders, whom they no longer want as allies.

Aided by much improved intelligence, so-called Tier One special forces - of which almost one-third are British SAS - have been carrying out intensive operations to "harvest" insurgent leaders. Hundreds have been captured or killed. The Americans have exchanged a policy of dispatching troops daily on armoured excursions from their huge bases for one of holding positions to provide visible security in the midst of Iraqi communities.

General Barry McCaffrey, a retired US officer fiercely critical of his nation's policies in Iraq, has just visited the country, seen all the top brass, and delivered a report to the US Military Academy at West Point. McCaffrey is full of praise for what Petraeus and his team are doing. He argues that there is now a slim chance of stabilising the country.

Yet everything turns not upon what Americans - much less the British - do, but upon Iraqis. "Reconciliation is the way out," writes the general. "There will be no imposed military solution with the current non-sustainable US force levels."

"Non-sustainable" applies, of course, to both the military and political constraints. Every senior officer engaged in Iraq knows that the British are easing out; the US army is stretched to its limits and beyond; the patience of Congress and the American people is ebbing fast.

It is common ground among all but irredeemable negativists that Petraeus's soldiers are doing better than anyone thought possible a year ago. Unfortunately, however, this is happening at three minutes to midnight. Pumpkin time is very close. Huge problems persist, first, with the paralysis of Iraqi rule. McCaffrey acknowledges "there is no function of government which operates across the nation".

Second, though progress is being made with training Iraqi soldiers and police, these are still a million miles from being sufficiently numerous, motivated, trained, or equipped to assume responsibility for the nation's security. McCaffrey calls for a hugely increased commitment to the forces: "We are still in the wrong ball park."

More than this, there is no chance of stabilising Iraq unless its people are provided with public services that work, and its economy is functioning in a fashion that gives most of its citizens a clear stake in peace. Almost four years after Baghdad fell, basic facilities such as electricity and sewerage, together with local security against crime and kidnapping, work less well than they did under Saddam.

This remains the catastrophic failure of the occupation, and the likeliest cause of its doom. A senior British officer to whom I spoke last week argues that Iraq needs a Marshall Plan, civil aid on a scale greater than anyone has yet attempted - or than the US Congress in its current mood is willing to endorse.

For US policy in Iraq to have a chance of working, the indispensable ingredient is time. Yet the storehouse of this precious commodity was almost emptied before Petraeus arrived. Everybody concerned with Iraq - the American and British governments, the precarious regime in Baghdad, the insurgents, the population across the country - is staring at the calendar, looking towards January 2009.

When George Bush quits the White House, it seems unlikely that any successor will be willing to maintain a big commitment in Iraq. The game will be over. Yet to put Iraq on its feet, to leave behind a viable society, a minimum of five years and hundreds of billions in cash will be needed.

Many of the right things are now being done, too late to retrieve the mistakes of 2003 and 2004. McCaffrey's report mentions the need for regional dialogue. Yet even on this it is hard to turn back the clock. In the early days Iran might, just might, have been willing to talk and act in support of its own rational interest in a stable Iraq. Today, however, the British and Americans are engaged in something close to a proxy war with the Iranians, escalated by the seizure of British sailors.

The foremost challenge is to persuade a sufficient number of Iraq's people to overcome a visceral desire to see their occupiers humiliated, and act on the basis of self-interest. However successful are Petraeus and his brightest and best in holding the ring, only the Iraqis can save themselves.

Today, as McCaffrey acknowledges: "No Iraqi government official, coalition soldier, diplomat, reporter, foreign NGO, nor contractor can walk the streets of Baghdad, nor Mosul, nor Kirkuk, nor Tikrit, nor Najaf, nor Ramadi, without heavily armed protection." Surge or no surge, there are not remotely enough western troops in Iraq to alter this wretched reality. Only the people who live there can do it.

At the end of my own spasm of soul-searching, I cannot quit my place among the gloom-mongers. It is hard to believe that, whatever tactical military successes Petraeus's people are achieving - and these are real enough - Iraq's leaders, security forces and citizens can take the strain in real time. We still look like losing.

Yet this should never become cause for exultation, even among the bitterest foes of the Washington neocons. If defeat, chaos, regional war indeed come to pass, the Iraqi people and the security interests of the west will suffer a disaster for which the disgrace of George Bush and Tony Blair will represent wholly inadequate compensation.